Syria: A Possibility of Some Things We May Not Like Developing

I'm getting caught up on the situation in Syria right now, I may have some more things to say about it later.

But I just came across this on al Jazeera's live blog.

3:28pm

Protesters in Deraa are shouting slogans denouncing Maher al-Assad, brother of the Syrian president and head of the Republican Guard, a witness tells Reuters. As they headed to the main square in the city after the funeral of at least five protesters killed by security forces this week, thousands chanted:

Maher you coward. Send your troops to liberate the Golan

 Israel captured the Golan Heights in a 1967 war.

Something to remember about democracy is that a lot of early pushes for democracy have involved revanchist claims.  While I think in the longer run developments in the Mid-East will be good for the international system, including western interests, there are likely to be some challenges arising out of it in the short term.  Democracy is great, but don't forget the actual course France followed, or Italian reunification, or even territorial claims of the early United States.  While some of the more recent waves of democratization have been generally peaceful, these transitions weren't accompanied by the kind of wide ranging social and cultural change that is occurring in the Mid-East, most of these transitions involved states that had already developed a stable national identity.  These identities are still being formed in most Middle Eastern countries, it would be unsurprising if they made similar claims to the early European democratizers whose transition happened in the midst of socio-cultural change as well.  Tensions with Israel may be the least of it.

Also, specific to Israel, if a democratic Syrian state starts making claims against Israel, where do we stand on this?  Much of our support for Israel (or at least the stated reason for it) owes to their status as the only democracy currently in the Mid-East.  If the Arab states around them become democratic and start making territorial claims, similar to claims that Israel makes in the West Bank, what will our position be on this?  It's a much different situation when claims on democratic legitimacy and other rationalizations of our position are no longer different between Israel and its neighbors.  This is something that deserves some serious thought sooner rather than later.

Tribes and Libya

I'm going to preface this by saying that I know nothing specific about tribalism in Libya, so this is all going to be on a more general level since I do know something about tribes more generally (though it's hardly one of the areas I'm most comfortable with).

This post is basically a reaction to Friedman's post from the 22nd.*  The issue of tribalism is an important one for discussing how these revolutions might possibly turn out in the Arab world, tribalism is certainly a major barrier to successful democratization and strong tribal structures can certainly go a long way towards short circuiting democratic transition.

However, this is true of just about any powerful ascriptive identity that is present in a population.  Too often talk of tribalism is used as some kind of excuse for why we're so advanced and the rest of the world is so far behind (Friedman's column doesn't quite step into this, I have some other issues with it rooted in IR theory, especially about artificial borders since virtually all borders are artificial, but they're not worth taking up here.  I could also go on for awhile about the tribe's with flags bit, it's more complex than that, but not worth it).

But tribal identity isn't that much different from the kind of personal and local loyalties that were present throughout Europe before the rise of the modern state.  They're not that much different from powerful lineage groups that were present at points in Chinese history.  Comparing and contrasting these forms of identity would probably take a (series) book, so I won't go in depth here.

My point is that while ascriptive identities such as tribal identities certainly are a barrier to democracy and something that needs to be considered when intervening, it's also something that was present at some point in all successful democratizers since it is a universal trait.  These forms of identity were usually overcome at some point well before democratic transition, especially in the west where wars against the cities, landowners, and religious wars, all served to help reduce personal loyalties and replace them with loyalty to the state, but history shows they can be overcome and often have (sometimes with explicit recognition of the divisions such as in Lebanon) even later in the process of development.

A common theme in replacing these earlier identities with something more akin to national identities is violence.  It is not necessary, but a frequent way of developing a national myth is a revolution, such as the American or French revolutions (though in both of these strong earlier identities had been substantially eroded before revolutions, in the American case mostly due to emigration to the colonies).

The relevance of this to Libya is two things.  First, tribal identities are a reason for caution, but they shouldn't be given too much importance.  These forms of identity are not constants, they change as institutions change and its fully plausible they haven't survived the heavy urbanization of Libya in strong enough form to be an insuperable barrier.  While tribalism was a problem in Iraq, Libya doesn't seem to have the further complication of sectarianism.  The second point is that the resistance to Qaddafi provides the germ from which a more modern form of identity can emerge that suits a modern state (not necessarily western nationalism, but tribal identities aren't very compatible with the kind of hierarchical authority pattern based on the rule of law essential to the functioning of a modern state).  This was lacking in Iraq and is a major problem in that country's ongoing attempt at transition (among many others).

An excellent article on Libya's tribalism also a appeared in the NY Times on March 21.

*I'm finally getting around to this after a busy week trying to get some work done before vacation in San Diego, which I've finally arrived in and will be here till Monday.  Starting next week posting should become more regular again.

What Happens to Tripoli?

This question has been bothering me.  Qaddafi seems firmly in control of the city for now and even if unrest does occur there I doubt there is any way for air support to effectively intervene.

Assuming there isn't a negotiated abdication of Qaddafi there doesn't seem to be any good outcome for the citizens of this city.  The rebels have a lot of irregulars, after a few weeks of heavy fighting in what will undoubtedly be a hard fought push to take the city how much trust we can have about how these soldiers will act in liberating Qaddafi's main stronghold?  There is also a possibility of street to street fighting which has historically been very rough on civilians.  While I think intervention on the whole saves civilian lives in what would have otherwise been years of brutal crackdowns by Qaddafi loyalists in the short term it is not unlikely that many will see the choice as having been to trade a slaughter in Tripoli for a slaughter in Benghazi.

I just hope there is some form of negotiated settlement or stalemate instead of the city having to be taken by the rebel forces.

Mission Creep Already?

This early in a conflict it's hard to tell how much accurate reporting is happening and how much is distorted due to limited sources.  This New York Times article is making me wonder if the US is already starting to play a larger role than it needs to.  I understand that it is essential for US forces to take out the anti-air defenses but I don't see the need for US forces to be striking at ground targets.  It may be that our larger naval forces and problems with coordinating still incoming allied forces mean that we have forces in striking distance of targets such as armor and artillery while others currently do not.  On the other hand, America has a poor track record of sharing command and operations with others so it is also possible we're suffering mission creep when we don't need to because of this characteristic of our strategic culture.  Too early to tell, but I was worried about this but cautiously optimistic that as a result of the reluctance of the administration to participate in the Libyan intervention that we'd avoid our usual fate of demanding a leadership role whenever we participate.

Also, the divisions in the Arab League worries me.  Part of this is expected, none of these countries are all that democratic and they want plausible deniability.  Hopefully this is all that is happening.  What discourages me is that this is an example of completely unrealistic assumptions about war.  It was never possible to enforce a no fly zone simply by sending jets over and only firing back when fired on.  Of course we were going to have to hit command and control centers, airstrips, and anti-air batteries.  To think otherwise is incredibly naive.

This is a problem that I see often however.  People want to impose morality designed for individuals on state and group action, namely don't strike until someone else strikes first and then do so proportionately.  This isn't possible when you have a responsibility to others that are being asked to take action.  I find the idea of ordering pilots into harms way without first doing all we can to mitigate the chances of their getting killed to be an immensely immoral action.  No one should have the right to do this when they have the power to defend those they are responsible for.  The responsibility for commanders to see to the well being of their troops require that known valid military targets be taken out first before individuals under their command are asked to risk their lives.  It's regrettable that live will be lost in the installations struck but weighed against the power that the state possesses against the rights of the people under its command this is clearly the lesser of the two evils.  If Qaddafi hadn't been intending to fight back his troops would have already been withdrawn, sending our planes in before taking out these installations would have been little different then sending our soldiers to the gallows since we both knew about and had the power to save their lives by eliminating these installations.  No state can do that with a clear conscience.

Libya: What are Foreign News Sites Saying?

[Update:  This is from Al Jazeera's live blog:

These offers of a ceasefire are a little strange, seeing as there is already the offer of a ceasefire from the foreign minister yesterday.
You have to ask if this is a decision being made in the full view of the Libyan public. When the military spokesman was asked if this was going to be broadcast on state TV and Libyans would be made aware that there was a ceasefire offer, he said no.

What kind of cease fire do you not announce to your own public?  If there was any question about the intent of these cease fires to be anything other than providing diplomatic cover and an attempt to split the military coalition I think this detail adds a lot of context.]


This is by no means a representative survey, just a brief run through of some foreign news sites I check moderately frequently.  Given the contentiousness of foreign interventions I thought others might be interested in some brief highlights.

Chinese news sites are unsurprisingly still dominated by headlines from Japan.  People's Daily plays it straight and is mostly reiterating China's focus on sovereignty without making any strong claims about the specifics of the Libya situation.

Xinhua is somewhat more opinionated and is not so subtly insinuating ulterior motives for the intervention.

Some highlights:

The western coalition claimed they launched the assault for humanitarian interests. But many analysts and media believed they did it for the sake of their own goals and interests instead of the safety and welfare of the unarmed Libyan civilians as they have claimed.

With a record-low popularity and facing a presidential election next year, Sarkozy was eager to take the reins in global crises and show voters that he can take the lead.

Gaddafi, then, offers Sarkozy an opportunity.

Pravda probably isn't an example of mainstream Russian opinion, but wow.  Read it for yourself; I have no comment.  Hitlerites, Luftwaffe on the Move. 

Al Jazeera's coverage has been studiously neutral from what I've read so far.  I find their live blog especially interesting.

 This is by no means meant to be a representative sample, it's simply a summary of what I've read so far.  If anyone has been reading some other foreign news sites that diverge in coverage from the US I'd be curious to know what they're saying.

Government Spending as Percent of GDP

Since I found the data figured I'd post it.  Pretty much the same comments as the taxation figures.  Government expenditure is even messier than tax expenditure, I guess I'm used to seeing smoothed charts.  Unfortunately the data set isn't as good, several states start late in the series, though oddly enough Korea starts earlier.  In any case, there's a sharp spike for the current recession but the same kind of flattening of spending occurs as with taxation, though it's a little harder to see and looks less clustered.  Korea is the only country with a clearly rising government expenditure, but that's expected.  Sweden breaks 70% spending and Finland breaks 60%, though neither of them maintains it for long.  I assume this is due to a recession and counter cyclical spending, but am too lazy to do the research to check for temporary blips.  On this chart we get a few countries whose spending settled above 50% (though Sweden's data series is so short and noisy I can't say they look like they've settled into anything), Belgium, France, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland (France's curve looks like it still may have a slight upward slope, probably because they have completely unsustainable labor practices, and Belgium just barely makes the cut).

For the most part though, spending seems to become basically flat between 40 and 50% of GDP in most cases, and this has been stable for some time.  Unfortunately this data set only begins in 1970 so it leaves out the years that experience rapid growth of government.  If the curve had been there it would be more obvious how much leveling out there is post 1980 (and from the chart a leveling out that proceeded somewhat messily between 1980 and 1990) for many countries compared to the rapid rise of the state in the 50s and 60s, though the tail end of this is visible in the 70s for the few countries the data is present for (I especially regret not having Spain which started so much less developed and caught up).  Korea appears to be the only state that remains on a clear upward trajectory, while all countries show a recent spike this is to be expected due to the shrinking of the economy in the recession, and judging from the sharp spikes and recoveries common before there is no reason to think this will be sustained.

[Unfortunately I haven't found a good way to put graphics of this size into the blog yet.  I may eventually find a way for now it should be enlargeable in your browser or you can get the OECD data directly.  It's much clearer in Openoffice where I can highlight individual lines.]

What Makes Libya Different?

I see a lot of commentary that seems to be taking the line that action in Libya can easily lead to us becoming over committed and feeling obligated to get involved elsewhere.  While it is never possible to be sure with military action, there's always a party advocating for ever more involvement, there are several factors that I think makes Libya different from other cases.

1. The Arab League endorsed intervention.  A major international innovation over the past century has been the development of a number of formal international bodies.  This has been particularly remarkable since WWII and is a major feature of the American international system.  So far, while these bodies have not always proven effective, they have proven to be far more effective at promoting peace than anything else yet tried in history.  As our relative power declines it is the strength and persistence of these bodies that has the most promise for creating a stable international system that we can continue to prosper in.  Raw power is something we won't possess enough of.  Enlarging and emphasizing the role of these organizations is in my opinion the number one strategic challenge on the US in the coming decades so that the world remains favorable to us even when we are one of several powers.
2. Libyan government defections (NY Times).  So far, none of the other revolts in the Mid-East has involved substantial defections of high ranking officials.  The defections mean there are substantial rifts in the Libyan government and give strong hints of how shallow his power is.  If he can't even keep the loyalty of officials dependent on the center his prospects for controlling the rest of the country effectively are dim.  He may be able to maintain some authority through brute power, but this is fragile and can't be maintained for long.  This hints very strongly that even if Qaddafi were to win stability would not be restored.
3. Large military defections, including pilots (NY Times).  Air forces are one of the most expensive, and by extension should have been one of the most loyal, military institutions a state has.  While numbers have been small, two fighters (does anyone know what happened to these two planes after landing in Europe?) and another voluntarily downed, this hints strongly that Qaddafi's grip on the military isn't the tight.  As the story linked to says it seems he has some intensely loyal brigades and that the bulk of the army is weak and poorly trained, but his reliance on mercenaries hints that he may not be all that certain of even these troops.  His grip on power seems linked to his series of successes, if western help can break this his forces may not keep stable enough for prolonged action.  Though forcing him from his capital will be problematic.
4. Refugees.  While there has been violent suppression of riots elsewhere this has not led to a mass exodus of people.  This hints strongly at a different scale of violence then has been observed elsewhere.